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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, William L. Forsyth, anpeals from
the order denying him the right to withdraw his plea of
guilty and the judarnent and sentence of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah Countv, State of Utah, the Honorable
J. Robert Bullock, presiding,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, after a hearina
on the Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
denied that motion on March 31st, 1976 and sentenced the
Appellant to a term in the State Penitentary on April
9th, 1976, with execution of that sentence stayed pending
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests that the order
and judgment of the District Court, denying the Motion
to withdraw the plea of guilty, be reversed and that
Appellant be allowed to enter a plea of not guilty and
be granted his right to a fair trial by an impartial jurv.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about August 18th, 1975, Appellant was
arraigned on five counts of theft by deception for alleged
violations of Sections 76-6-405 and 76-6-412, Utah Code

Ann. (1953 as amended). The charging statute and complaint
describe this as a specific intent crime.
states: "Theft by deception.

The statute

(1) A person commits theft

if he obtains or exercises control over property of another
by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
Each of the five counts in the indictment contain the
language that "at the time and place" the money was taken
"by deception and with a purpose and intent to deprive
said individuals of the same."
Trial was' set for January 5th, 1976.

On January

5th, 1976, the trial was continued until February 2nd,
1976 because Appellant and defense counsel had not then
met together sufficiently to adequately prepare the defense.
The reasons given by Appellant and his counsel for the
delay were that Appellant had not been able to pay his
attorney, and felt he could not reasonably make the extensive demands on the attorney's time necessary for adequate preparation.

(Hearing Transcript of January 5th,

1976 P. 5 ) . Appellant had been lead to believe by his
attorney, that the attorney would be unable to successfully
defend him against the charge because of Appellant's inability to pay necessary fees and expenses.

(Affidavit

of February 27, 1976, p.3). As an additional concern to
Mr. Forsyth at the time of the scheduled trial on January
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5th, his attorney had before the Court a motion to withdraw
as counsel.
In a hearing before the Court on January 30th,
1976, Appellant requested permission to change his plea
as to Count 1 of the information and the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining Counts,
January 30th, 1976, p.2).

(Hearing Transcript of

When asked by the Court whether

he was pleading guilty to Count 1 because he was quilty,
Appellant initially responded that he was chanqing his
plea for another reason.
30th, 1976, p.6).

(Hearing Transcript of January

He had been lead to believe that he

could plead "no contest" instead of quilty to Count 1.
(Hearing Transcript of February 27th, 1976, p.3). After
a brief conference in the hall with defense counsel and
the prosecutor, Appellant made the plea of quilty.

(Hearing

Transcript of January 30th, 1976, p.8). During the conference, the prosecutor commented to the Appellant that
he would face a "red-necked" jury, which would probably
convict him in all Counts, if he did not plead quilty,
and both defense counsel and the prosecutor represented
to Appellant that he would likely get probation by pleading
guilty.

(Affidavit of February 27th, 1976, p.3).
On February 27th, 1976, prior to sentencing,

Appellant petitioned to the Court to withdraw the plea of
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guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty.

Appellant

asserted his innocence and that the plea was not knowinqly
or voluntarily made because of the intimidations of the
prosecutor and the lack of adequate representation and
undue influence of defense counsel.
27th, 1976).

(Affidavit of February

Defendant testified that he did not know that

he was scheduled to enter a guilty plea until just five
minutes prior to entering Court, thinking instead that
he was to enter a "no contest" or nolo contendre plea.
(Transcript of February 27th, 1976, p.3).
On March 22, 1976, in a hearing to consider the
motion to withdraw the plea, the Court heard a proffer of
evidence from the State and from the defense.
Transcript of March 22, 1976).

(Hearing

The Court employed a probable

cause standard in accessing the sufficiency of the State's
evidence to prove guilt.
1976, p.25).

(Hearing Transcript of March 5,

Subsequently, on March 31, 1976, the Motion

to withdraw the plea was denied, and Defendant was sentenced
on April 9, 1976.

From that order and sentence, the appeal

is taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT MADE VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT UNDUE INFLUENCE, OR UNDERSTANDINGLY.
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The standard for a valid guilty plea is expressed
in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969),
wherein it was stated that "a plea of guilty must be made
voluntarily, without undue influence or coercion. . . w
Id. at 296, 324.

In that case it was further commented

"that under some circumstances the extraction of a plea
to one charge as a condition to the* dismissal of others
might be used in such a manner as to amount to undue influence or coercion, which would negate the voluntariness
of the plea."

Id. at 296, 324.

In the present case the

prosecution's remarks to appellant concerning the appellant
having to face a "red-necke'd" or hanging jury, constituted
undue influence in exacting a plea of guilty as a condition
for the dismissal of the other charges.
Further, such pressure from the prosecution would
be classified as a "subtle threat" within the meaning of
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).

It was said

there that such acts might be "a perfect cover up of unconstitutionality."

Id. at 243.

The prosecution did not

at any time denv or refute these intimidating comments.
In the face of such evidence, the trial court should have
granted the motion to withdraw the plea and the denial of
the motion constituted a denial of the Appellant's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by an im-
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partial jury.
The short delay between the entering of the plea
and the assertion of innocence evidenced a strong indication
that the plea was entered in haste and confusion.

Confusion

in the Appellant's mind as to the impact and the reasons
for the plea was evident in his initial assertion to the
Court that there was another reason for entering the plea
besides making a plea of guilty.
guilt.

He did not want to admit

He maintained that he was innocent.

He had in

fact made a tactical decision to plead "no contest" when
faced with counsel's representations that adequate defense
would not be forthcoming without pay.

At the time Mr.

Forsyth entered his plea of guilty, he was still under
the opinion, in the words of his attorney, " . . . that unless
he paid me I would not represent him. . . and that he was
embarrassed and felt it would be futile to contact me until
he had raised some money."

(Hearing Transcript of January

5th, 1976, p.5). Appellant was unable to raise any money
for his attorney and under all these pressures resigned
himself to entering a "no contest" plea.

His dilemma was

further compounded when five minutes prior to entering his
plea he was informed that "no contest" was not a valid plea
and was confronted with the subtle threats in the hall from
the prosecution and his own defense attorney.
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(Hearing

Transcript of Feb. 27, 1976f p.3).
As lon$ ago as State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 89,
7 P.2d 825, 833, (1932) this Court gave the indication that
a guilty plea that was "influenced unduly or improperly
either by hope or fear, or that . . . was entered by reason
of mistake or misapprehension or undue influence," should
properly be allowed to be withdrawn.

If Appellant's af-

fidavit and other arguments made to the Court concerning
the undue influence exerted on the Appellant were inadequate
to satisfy the District Court, then Appellant's offer of
further sworn testimony should have been accepted.

(Hearing

Transcript of March 5, 197 6, p.3)
With a showing of undue influence on the part
of the prosecution and the misunderstanding on the part
of the Appellant, the Appellant should have been granted
his right to withdraw the plea to insure preservation of
his constitutional rights to due process and a fair jury
trial.
The transcript of the hearing of January 30th,
at which time the plea of guilty was entered must be considered in light of the evidence contained in Appellant's
affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea and other
evidence before the Court.

The Appellant claims that

he only "acted out" his required role before Judge Bullock,
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having been intimidated and coerced into saying what the
Court, his attorney and the prosecutor obviously wanted,
to allow the guilty plea to be accepted.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN USING A PROBABLE CAUSE
STANDARD OF PROOF IN ASSERTAINING IF
THERE WAS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF GUILTY
Probable cause is the standard of proof applied
to justify a search or seizure.

U.S. Constituion, Amendment

IV, Utah Constitution, Art. I, §14.

The assertion of prob-

able cause must be supported by sworn oath or affirmation
before the Court.

Id.

The Defendant, his counsel and the

prosecutor stipulated to the Courtfs hearing an offer of
proof of the evidence against the accused and in his defense.
The Court determined that such offer of proof would be
unsworn and considered on the basis of probable cause.
(Hearing Transcript of March 5, 1976, p.5).
Since the rendering, acceptance and retemtion
of a guilty plea over the objections of the accused is an
even more serious action than a search or seizure and constitutes at least a waiver of a basic constitutional right,
it requires a higher standard of proof than a mere showing
of probable cause.

A guilty plea in fact becomes more than

a waiver of constitutional rights; it is itself a conviction.
Boykin, supra, at 242.
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The Appellant's plea of guilty and statement that
he was gulity were later offset by his frequent assertions
and claims of innocence.

In North Carolina v. Alfordy

400 U.S. 25, 27 (1974) the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a factual basis for accepting a plea of guilty which was
coupled with assertions of innocence, was adequately established with the showing of "strong evidence of guilt".
This required standard is a higher 'level of proof than the
"reasonable grounds to believe" test and the "what the State
thought it could prove and intended to prove" standard as
used in this case.

(Hearing Transcript of March 22f 1976,

p.18).
Considering the qravity, impact and finality of
a guilty plea, the Court should have used a higher level
of proof and required strong and convincing evidence from
the prosecution before denying the Motion to withdraw the
plea.
POINT III
EVEN
WAS
NOT
A

IF A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD OF PROOF
NOT PROPER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADEQUATELY ASCERTAINING IF THERE WAS
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF GUILTY.

The Federal Courts have stressed that "guilt pleas
coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted
unless there is a factual basis for the plea. . ."

North

Carolina v. Alford, supra, at 38. In Alford the denied
withdrawal of the plea was not an abuse of discretion because
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the prosecution presented "strong evidence of guilt and
the defendant had no substantial evidentary support for
the claim of innocence.

In determining the factual basis

for the plea in Alford, the Court heard the sv/orn testimonies
of a police officer who summarized the State's case, two
other witnesses, and the defendant.

That evidence was held

to be sufficiently strong to prevent a reversal.
In the present case such "strong evidence", to
establish the required factual basis is absent.
script of Hearings of March 22, 1976).

(See Tran-

There were only

the assertions of the prosecutor as to what the State's
evidence would be.

Even if probable cause was th€> proper

standard of proof to apply, oath or affirmation was not
made supporting the showing of probable cause.
no sworn testimony.
of witnesses.

There was

There were no affidavits or depositions
i

Even the integrity of some of the prosecutions

recorded information was challenged by defense counsel.
(Hearing Transcript of March 22, 1976, p.17, 18). The
losses of one of the alleged victims were challenged, but
were not substantiated by the prosecution.

When defense

counsel challenged the pjroposed evidence as inadmissable,
no attempt was made to establish its admissability.
A credible claim of meritorious defenses was also
raised by defense counsel undermining any claim the prosecution may have had for strong evidence of guilt.
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Defense

counsel raised substantial issue as to whether the prosecution could prove the required intent of the alleged
crime.

Here again, no sworn testimony or any direct evidence

was offered to establish a factual basis for that element.
Without adequate, strong evidence establishing a factual
basis for the plea, it was error to deny the withdrawal
of the plea.
POINT IV
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
THE GUILTY PLEA WAS AN ABUSE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION RESULTING IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND UNFAIRNESS.
No prejudice to the State would have ensued with
the granting of the Motion to withdraw the plea as was
admitted by the prosecution, but by denying the motion
the trial Court prevented the Appellant from getting a
fair trial before an impartial jury.

Further, since the

motion was a pre-sentence request, it was not a hidden
challenge to the Judge's sentence.

The fact that the

Appellant asserted his legal innocence was an important
factor to be weighed.

Indeed, in such cases a pre-sentence

withdrawal should be freely granted. United States v. Joslin,
140 U.S. App. DC 252, 434 F2d 526 (1970).
POINT V
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
IN REGARD TO MAKING THE PLEA OF GUILTY.
Appellant assorted by affidavit that defense
counsel led him to believe that because he was unable to
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pay counsel that his defense would be jeopardized.

Ap-

pellant further maintained that the defense counsel had
not adequately represented him from the time the continuance
was granted on January 5, 1976, until the time that the
Appellant requested withdrawal of the plea.

Although

Appellant expressed the feeling that the defense counsel
was capable of adequately representing him, and in fact
he desired that defense counsel continue to represent him
because of his familiarity with the case, Appellant did
maintain that representation had been inadequate and misleading during the time the guilty plea was entered.
Counsel had lead him to believe that an adequate defense
could not be presented without prepayment of fees to the
attorney and payment of professional fees to an accountant,
(Hearing Transcript of January 5, 1976f p.7) f and that
Appellant could likely expect probation by pleading guilty.
There was direct implication made that Defendant would
be treated more strictly with a finding of guilt as opposed
to a plea of guilt.

Neither contention was contested by

either defense counsel or the prosecution.

Such actions

on the part of the defense counsel caused fear and misapprehension for the Appellant of undesirable consequences
if he did not plead guilty.
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The importance of safeguarding the right to
adequate counsel at the time of the entry of a guilty plea
was emphasized in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 121,
449 P.2d 241, 243 (1969).

Such a challenge to the adequecy

of counsel as in the present case merited further inquiry
by the Court or at least rebuttal by the prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Appellant contends that the guilty plea was
made under the stress of undue influence and coercion from
the prosecution and defense counsel and that he should
have the right to withdraw that plea.

Further, it is

contended that the trial Court abused its discretion
by denying the withdrawal, resulting in manifest injustice
to Appellant.

No prejudice to the State would have ensued,

but the Appellant, asserting innocence was denied a hearing
before an impartial jury.

Additionally, in the face of

Appellantfs claims of innocence, no adequate factual basis
for accepting the plea was established.

Appellant was

further denied the right to effective counsel because of
his financial circumstances.
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that
the judgment of the lower court be reversed to allow Appellant to withdraw the plea of guilty and substitute a
plea of not guilty.
Respectfully submitted,

Steven L. Grow,
Attorney for Appellant
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